It is known that the security evaluation can be done by smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 in the classical and quantum settings when we apply universal 2 hash functions. Using the smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2, we derive security bounds for L 1 distinguishability and modified mutual information criterion under the classical and quantum setting, and have derived these exponential decreasing rates. These results are extended to the case when we apply ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions. Furthermore, we apply this analysis to the secret key generation with error correction.
L 1 distinguishability criterion with universal 2 hash functions based on a quantum version of conditional Rényi entropy of order 2. In order to apply Renner's two universal hashing lemma to a realistic setting, Renner [22] attached the smoothing to min entropy, which is a lower bound on the above quantum version of conditional Rényi entropy of order 2. That is, he proposed to maximize the min-entropy among the sub-states whose trace norm distance to the true state is less than a given threshold. However, it is not easy to find the maximizing sub-state. Instead of the rigorous maximization of min entropy under this condition, we can consider a lower bound of the maximum of min entropy. In the following, we say that this type of lower bound or the method based on this type of lower bound is an approximate smoothing of min entropy. In contrast with an approximate smoothing, we say that the tight value of min entropy under the given condition or the method based on the tight value is the rigorous smoothing of min entropy.
Indeed, the same difficulty still holds even for the maximum of Rényi entropy of order 2 under the same condition. Hence, we can consider an approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. Considering an approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2, the previous paper [17] derived an upper bound of the L 1 distinguishability criterion after an application of universal 2 hash functions in the classical setting. In the n-fold independent and identical case, the upper bound yields a lower bound of the exponential decreasing rate of the L 1 distinguishability criterion. The obtained lower bound is tight with no side information [17] . The same fact is also shown with classical side information by combination of [71] and the forthcoming paper [53] . This fact shows that the approximate smoothing gives a sub-distribution that is sufficiently close to the sub-distribution maximizing the Rényi entropy of order 2 in the classical setting. However, no study treats the approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 in the quantum case. One of the purposes of this paper is to attach the approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 and to evaluate the L 1 distinguishability criterion in the quantum case.
Further, when we employ the rigorous smoothing of min entropy instead of approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2, we can derive another lower bound of the exponential decreasing rate of the L 1 distinguishability criterion. When there is no side information, it was shown in [17] that the lower bound based on the rigorous smoothing of min entropy is not tight, i.e., strictly weaker than the bound based on the approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 given 0018-9448 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
in [17] . Further, the paper [71] showed the same fact when the side information classical. Due to this superiority of approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 over the rigorous smoothing of min entropy, it is natural to extend the bound given by [17] to the quantum case. The security of secret key generation by universal 2 hush function has been discussed mainly in the cryptography community and has not been studied in the information theory community while the problem can be described by information theoretic quantity. However, the mutual information has not been discussed in this topic while the mutual information has been widely accepted as the criterion of information security by so many papers [6] , [7] , [67] [68] [69] [70] . In fact, the security of the wiretap channel model has been mainly discussed with the mutual information among information theory community [35] , [40] [41] [42] . Watanabe [39] gave an interesting example in the classical setting, in which, the mutual information is not close to zero while the L 1 distinguishability criterion is close to zero. His example suggests the demand of the convergence of the mutual information. Therefore, it is needed to evaluate the security based on the mutual information as well as the security based on the L 1 distinguishability criterion because so many recent literatures [34] , [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] still accept the mutual information.
However, the mutual information does not reflect the uniformity while it reflects the independence. In order to address the uniformity as well as leaked information, we need the modification of mutual information, which is called the modified mutual information criterion and is explained in Subsection II-C. As is shown in Appendix A, if we suppose several natural conditions for the security criterion, it is limited to the modified mutual information criterion. Hence, it is needed to evaluate the modified mutual information criterion as well as the L 1 distinguishability criterion.
In fact, when one of two security criteria goes to zero exponentially, the other also goes to zero exponentially due to the relations given in Subsection II-C. Hence, the asymptotic key generation rate does not depend on the choice of the security criterion. However, the relations given in Subsection II-C cannot decide one of their exponential decreasing rates from the other exponent. Hence, we need to consider both exponents separately.
B. First Main Result
As our result, first, we obtain upper bounds of the above two kinds of secrecy criteria when Alice and Bob share the same random number and Eve has a correlated quantum state by using the approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 (Theorems 24, and 25). This problem is called the secret key generation without errors. To upper bound the approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2, we introduce quantum versions of conditional Rényi entropies of general order 1 + s so that the conditional entropy can be recovered with the limit 1 + s → 1. Applying the bound to the independent and identical distributed (i.i.d.) case, we obtain lower bounds on the exponential decreasing rate of the above two kinds of secrecy criteria (Theorem 26). We also show that the obtained lower bound for universal composable criterion is tight in a typical example, in which, the leaked information is given as a pure state and can be regarded as the environment of Pauli channel. This fact suggests the superiority of our method even in the quantum setting.
Our lower bounds of the exponential decreasing rates are given as the maximums of functions given by quantum versions of conditional Rényi entropies of general order 1 + s in terms of s. Since the optimum s depends on the key generation rate, it is essential to derive our bound for a general order 1 + s. Here, we remark that our bounds enable us to derive upper bounds for the two kinds of secrecy criteria in the finite-length setting because our bounds come from single-shot bounds.
Further, we note that the presentation style of this paper is different from that of existing researches [11] , [22] , [37] with respect to security evaluation in the single-shot form. These papers [11] , [22] , [37] bounded the length of the generated keys when the amount of leaked information is fixed. In contrast, this paper bounds the amount of leaked information when the length of generated keys is fixed. The latter style is useful for evaluation of the exponential decreasing rate.
C. Second Main Result
In a realistic situation, the distinct two parties, Alice and Bob, do not necessarily share the perfectly same random variables although Eve has a correlated quantum state. To distill secure keys in this situation is called the secret key generation with error correction and has been discussed by so many papers as follows. The classical case has been treated by Ahlswede & Csiszár [7] , Maurer [6] , and Muramatsu [10] et al. Renner [22] treated the case when Eve's initial information is quantum. As a generalization, it is natural to consider the case when Alice's and Bob's initial information are quantum states. Devetak & Winter [23] derived the distillable secure key rates. However, they did not discuss the exponential decreasing rates for the amount of leaked information nor the error probability.
In this paper, we consider the case when Alice's initial information is classical although Eve's and Bob's initial information are quantum. To achieve the exponential decay of the error probability, we adopt the decoder and the evaluation method given in [20] to our setting. Note that as is explained in the beginning of Subsection VII-B, this problem is different from classical-quantum channel coding [76] , [77] . To achieve the exponential decay of the amount of leaked information, we apply the hash functions and employ the evaluation method obtained as the first main result. Unfortunately, the direct applications of the first main result do not give simple upper bounds of the two kinds of secrecy criteria. Therefore, for secure key generation in this situation, we need to discuss the error correction and the privacy amplification together because these two topics are correlated with each other. That is, the separate discussion of both topics cannot bring simple exponential decreasing rates of the error probability and the leaked information.
To derive simple exponential decreasing rates, we invent an original formula (21) for the quantum versions of conditional Rényi entropies of general order 1 + s.
Then, we derive exponential decreasing rates of leaked information even for the secret key generation with error correction (Theorems 32 and 34). In particular, we obtain the different exponential decreasing rates for the modified mutual information criterion dependently of the type of our error correction. That is, the obtained exponential decreasing rate for the modified mutual information criterion with fixed error correction is worse than that with randomized error correction. This difference reflects the difficulty for the exponential evaluation for the modified mutual information criterion in the secret key generation with error correction. This fact implicitly suggests that the obtained exponential decreasing rates are not simple consequences of the first main result.
D. Generalization of Main Results
Recently, Tomamichel et al. [37] extended two universal hashing lemma, i.e., they showed the security with a larger class of hash functions, which is the class of ε-almost universal 2 hash functions in the sense of [1] , [2] when ε is close to 1 while they [37] used a different terminology. Tsurumaru et al [19] proposed the concept "ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions" for linear universal 2 hash functions, which are defined as the dual functions of ε-almost universal 2 hash functions. They also showed that the ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions contain the original universal 2 hash functions when ε = 2. Tsurumaru et al [19] showed the security of ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions when ε increases polynomially with respect to the coding length while Tomamichel et al. [37] showed the security of ε-almost universal 2 hash functions when ε is close to 1. Tsurumaru et al [19] also gave an insecure example for 2-almost universal 2 hash functions over the finite field F 2 . This example suggests that ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions have a larger expandability than ε-almost universal 2 hash functions. Further, the recent paper [46] gave concrete examples of ε-almost universal 2 hash functions that have a smaller calculation amount and a smaller number of random seeds than the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix, which is a typical example of universal 2 hash functions. The ε-almost universal 2 hash functions properly work with non-uniform random seeds. Hence, it is useful from an applied viewpoint to evaluate the security with ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions.
On the other hand, Dodis and Smith [12] proposed the concept "δ-biased family" for a family of random variables. The concept "ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions" can be converted to a part of "δ-biased family" [12] , [19] . Indeed, Dodis et al. [12] and Fehr et al. [13] showed a security lemma (Proposition 16). Employing this conversion and the above security lemma by [12] and [13] , we derive a variant of two universal hashing lemma for "ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions" while Tsurumaru et al [19] showed the security for this class of hash function by evaluating the virtual decoding phase error probability by using the relation between the virtual phase error correction and the privacy amplification. The variant can be regarded as a kind of generalization of two universal hashing lemma by Renner [22] . Replacing the role of two universal hashing lemma by Renner [22] by this variant, we can extend the main results for universal 2 hash functions to the case of the application of "ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions", which is a wider class of hash functions than universal 2 hash functions (Lemma 23 and Theorems 27, 30,  31, 33, and 35 ).
E. Relation With Second Order Analysis
In the i.i.d. case, when the rate of generated random numbers is smaller than the entropy rate (or conditional entropy rate) of the original information source, it is possible to generate the random variable, in which, the L 1 distinguishability criterion approaches zero asymptotically. In the realistic setting, we can manipulate only a finite size operation. In order to approximately evaluate the performance in the finite length setting, we have two kinds of formalism for the i.i.d. setting.
The first one is the second order formalism, in which, we focus on the asymptotic expansion up to the second order √ n of the length of generated keys l n as l n = H n + C √ n + o( √ n) with the constant constraint for the L 1 distinguishability criterion when the input key length is n. The second one is the exponent formalism, in which, we fixed the generation rate R := l n /n and evaluate the exponential decreasing rate of the convergence of the L 1 distinguishability criterion. In the exponent formalism, it is not sufficient to show that the security parameter goes to zero exponentially, and it is required to explicitly give lower and/or upper bounds for the exponential decreasing rate. The exponent formalism has been studied for various information theoretical problems, e.g., channel coding [9] , [33] , source coding [34] , [36] , [44] , and wire-tap channel [18] , [35] . In the quantum case, the same topic has been studied also in channel coding [20] , source coding [43] , wire-tap channel [50] , and entanglement concentration [49] , [51] . As the second order formalism, the optimal coding length with the fixed error probability has been derived up to the second order √ n in various settings [28] [29] [30] in the case of classical channel coding. The previous paper [31] treated the uniform random number generation with the second order formalism based on the information spectrum approach [32] , which is closely related to -smooth min-entropy. Then, another previous paper [27] discussed the randomness extraction with quantum side information with the second order formalism by using the relation with -smooth min-entropy [22] and quantum versions of the information spectrum [15] , [26] . The classical case of the result [27] can be regarded as a finite-length bound based on smoothing of min entropy. As the above way, both formalisms have been discussed actively.
Since the secret key generation by universal 2 hash functions has been studied mainly in the cryptography community, it has not been studied with the exponent formalism sufficiently while the exponential decreasing rate is a standard topic in the information theory community. Since the exponential decreasing rate of the decoding error probability in the source coding is characterized by Rényi entropy in the classical [44] and the quantum [43] case, many information-theoretical people might be interested in whether the secret key generation has a similar characterization in the exponent formalism. Here, we should remark that the tight bound of the exponent formalism is not necessarily derived from the results of the second order formalism as follows. As mentioned by Han [32] , the information spectrum approach cannot yield the optimal exponent of error probability in the channel coding. This fact suggests that the exponent formalism requires a method different from the second order formalism.
Recently, the previous paper [17] derived an exponential decreasing rate of leaked information in the L 1 distinguishability criterion in the classical setting. The tightness of the rate is shown in the paper [53] . Based on the results [17] , [27] , another recent paper [52] numerically dealt with the L 1 distinguishability criterion with the finite-length setting in the i.i.d. case. Comparing the bounds based on both formalisms, the paper [52] numerically showed their comparative merits dependently of the length of the data and the threshold of the L 1 distinguishability criterion. That is, it clarified that the bound based on the exponent formalism is better than the bound based on the second order formalism when the length of the data is not too large and the threshold of the L 1 distinguishability criterion is too small. To understand the difference mathematically, we need to focus on the speed of the convergence. When the L 1 distinguishability criterion is too small, the convergence of the second order formalism is not so good as that of the exponent formalism. Therefore, we need to choose the formalism to approximate the finitelength bound dependently of the speed of the convergence.
While the paper [27] derived a finite-length bound achieving the optimal second order rate by using smoothing of min entropy, the bound in the classical case requires the evaluation of the tail probability, which causes the following drawback. In the case of binary distribution, the tail probability can be numerically calculated. Otherwise, its calculation is not easy when the data has a huge size. Hence, we often apply the Berry-Esseen theorem (the central limit theorem). However, when the tail probability is too small, the convergence of Berry-Esseen theorem is not so good. In this case, the approximation by Berry-Esseen theorem is not so good as that by Chernoff bound, which essentially gives the exponential decreasing rate. When the tail probability is evaluated by Chernoff bound, this type of bound essentially gives an exponential decreasing upper bound based on an approximate smoothing of min entropy. That is, this type of evaluation of the second order formalism is simulated by a special case of the evaluation of the exponent formalism. 1 This fact suggests the superiority of the exponent formalism when the data has a huge size. We have the similar importance of the exponent formalism in the quantum case because the numerical calculation based on the bound given in [27] is more difficult in the quantum case except for the special example given in [27] . Therefore, to discuss the finite-length bound, we need the exponent formalism when the data has a huge size. 1 The discussion in Subsection I-A shows that the evaluation by combination of the evaluation by the paper [27] and the Chernoff bound does not give the tight exponential evaluation because the evaluation by the paper [27] is the rigorous smoothing of min entropy.
F. Organization
Now, we give the outline of the preliminary parts, which is summarized in Table I . In Section II, we introduce the information quantities for evaluating the security and derive several useful inequalities for the quantum case. We also give a clear definition for security criteria. In section III, we introduce several classes of hash functions (universal 2 hash functions and ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions). We clarify the relation between ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions and δ-biased family. We also derive an ε-almost dual universal 2 version of Renner's two universal hashing lemma [22, Lemma 5.4.3] (Lemma 17) based on Lemma for δ-biased family given by Dodis et al. [12] and Fehr et al. [13] in the classical and quantum setting. These parts give the definitions for concepts and quantities describing the main results. The latter preliminary parts are more technical and used for proofs of the main results. In section IV, under the universal 2 condition or the ε-almost dual universal 2 condition, we evaluate the L 1 distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information based on Rényi entropy of order 2.
Next, we outline the main results. In Section V, we obtain a suitable bound in the single-shot setting by attaching an approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 to the evaluation obtained in the previous section. In Section VI, we derive an exponential decreasing rate for both criteria when we simply apply hash functions and there is no error between Alice's and Bob's information.
In Section VII, we proceed to the secret key generation with error correction. In this case, we need error correction as well as the privacy amplification. We derive an exponential decreasing rate of the error probability in this setting. We also derived upper bounds for the L 1 distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information for a given sacrifice rate. Based on these upper bounds, we derive the exponential decreasing rates for both criteria.
In Section VIII, we apply our result to the QKD case. That is, the state is given by the quantum communication via Pauli channel, which is a typical case in quantum key distribution. For this example, we showed that our approximate smoothing is tight in the sense of exponents. This evaluation is shown in Appendix E.
II. PREPARATION

A. Information Quantities for Single System 1) Case of Sub-States:
In order to discuss the security problem in the quantum systems, we prepare several information quantities in the single quantum system. In the following, a non-negative Hermitian matrix ρ is called a sub-state when Tr ρ ≤ 1. First, we define the following quantities: Then, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The functions s → ψ(s|ρ σ ), ψ (s|ρ σ ) are convex. In particular, they are strictly convex when ρ and σ are not completely mixed.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix C. Lemma 1 yields the following lemma. are monotonically increasing with respect to s in (0, ∞) and (−∞, 0). In particular, they are strictly monotonically increasing with respect to s when ρ and σ are not completely mixed.
For any quantum operation , the following information processing inequalities
hold for s ∈ (0, 1] [14, (5, 30) , (5.41) ]. However, this kind of inequality does not fold for ψ(s|ρ σ ) in general.
Lemma 3: The relation
holds for s ∈ (0, 1]. Lemma 3 is shown in Appendix B. For the latter discussion, we define the pinching map, which is used for our proof of another lemma. For a given Hermitian matrix X, we focus on
where v is the number of the eigenvalues of X. Then, the pinching map E X is defined as
Then, the inequality
holds [14, Lemma 3.8] and [15] . Inequality (7) is used in the proof of Lemma 3. 
for s > 0.
B. Information Quantities in Composite System
1) Case of Joint Sub-State: Next, we prepare several information quantities in the composite system H A ⊗ H E . Throughout this paper, H A is a classical system spanned by the basis {|a }. A composite sub-state ρ is called a c-q substate when it has a form ρ A,E = a P A (a)|a a| ⊗ ρ E|a , in which the conditional state ρ E|a is normalized. For a given c-q state ρ A,E , we define the sub-states ρ E := Tr A ρ A,E and ρ A := Tr E ρ A,E . Then, we define the normalized states ρ E,normal := ρ E /Tr ρ E and ρ A,normal := ρ A /Tr ρ A . Then, the von Neumann entropies and Rényi entropies of order 1 + s are given as
Quantum versions of the conditional entropy and the min entropy, and two kinds of quantum versions of conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + s are given as
with s ∈ R \ {0}. These quantities can be written in the following way:
where ρ mix,A is the completely mixed state on H A . When we replace ρ E,normal by another normalized state σ E on H E , we obtain the following generalizations:
.
for s ∈ (0, 1]. Using Lemma 2, we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 5: H 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E σ E ) and H 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E σ E ) are monotonically decreasing with respect to s in (0, ∞) and (−∞, 0). In particular, they are strictly monotonically decreasing with respect to s in (0, ∞) and (−∞, 0) when ρ A,E and σ E are not completely mixed.
Further, since
has been shown for s ∈ (0, 1] in [24] . When we apply a quantum operation on H E , since it does not act on the classical system A, (4) implies that
When we apply the function f to the classical random number
2) Case of Joint Normalized State: When the joint state ρ A,E is normalized, we can show several additional useful properties as follows. In this case, since D(ρ E σ E ) ≥ 0, we obtain
Further, using Lemma 4, we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 6: In particular,
for s > 0. Now, we introduce another kind of conditional Rényi entropy for a joint normalized state as
This quantity can be expressed as
by using the Gallager type function [17] :
Taking the limit s → 0, we obtain
Then, we obtain the following lemma:
holds for s ∈ (−1, ∞). The maximum can be realized when
. The proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix D. As a corollary of Lemma 7, we have the following. Corollary 8: The map s → H G 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E ) is monotonically decreasing for s ∈ (−1, ∞). In particular, it is strictly decreasing for s ∈ (−1, ∞) when ρ A,E is not completely mixed.
Proof:
for s < t. 
That
Using the Lemma 7, we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 9: Given a c-q sub state ρ A,E = a P A (a)|a a|⊗ ρ E|a , any TP-CP map on H E satisfies that
Proof: Due to (12) and Lemma 7, we obtain C. Criteria for Secret Random Numbers 1) Case of Joint Sub-State: Next, we introduce criteria for the amount of the information leaked from the secret random number A to E for joint sub-state ρ A,E . Using the trace norm, we can evaluate the secrecy for the state ρ A,E as follows:
Taking into account the randomness, Renner [22] defined the following criteria for security of a secret random number:
It is known that the quantity is universally composable [38] . We call it the L 1 distinguishability criterion.
Renner [22] defined the conditional L 2 -distance from uniform of ρ A,E relative to a normalized state σ E on H E :
Using this value, we can evaluate
2) Case of Joint Normalized State: In the remaining part of this subsection, we assume that the state ρ A,E is a normalized state. The correlation between the classical system A and the quantum system H E can be evaluated by the mutual information
This quantity has been adopted by many papers [6] , [7] , [34] , [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] , [67] [68] [69] [70] as a criteria of independence. In order to take account into uniformity as well as independence, we modify the mutual information by using the completely mixed state ρ mix,A on A:
which is called the modified mutual information and satisfies
and
This quantity I (A : E|ρ A,E ) represents the amount of information leaked by E, and the remaining quantity D(ρ A ρ mix,A ) describes the difference of the random number A from the uniform random number. So, if the quantity I (A|E|ρ A,E ) is small, we can conclude that the random number A has less correlation with E and is close to the uniform random number. In particular, if the quantity I (A|E|ρ A,E ) goes to zero, the mutual information I (A : E|ρ A,E ) goes to zero, and the marginal distribution ρ A goes to the uniform distribution.
In this paper, we can adopt the quantity I (A|E|ρ A,E ) as a criterion for qualifying the secret random number. The detail validity of the quantity I (A|E|ρ A,E ) is given in Appendix A.
Using the quantum version of Pinsker inequality, we obtain
Conversely, we can evaluate I (A : E|ρ A,E ) and I (A|E|ρ A,E ) by using d 1 (A|E|ρ A,E ) and d 1 (A|E|ρ A,E ) in the following way. When ρ A,E is a normalized c-q state, applying the Fannes inequality, we obtain
where d E is the dimension of H E . Similarly, using the function η(x, y) := −x log x + x y, we obtain
where a follows from the Fannes inequality [78] .
III. ENSEMBLE OF HASH FUNCTIONS
A. Ensemble of General Hash Functions
In this section, we focus on an ensemble { f X } of hash functions f X from A to B, where X is a random variable identifying the function f X . In this case, the total information of Eve's system is written as the composite system of H E and X. By using the state ρ f X ( A),E,X :=
Then, the modified mutual information is written as
We say that a function ensemble { f X } is ε-almost universal 2 [1] , [2] , [19] , if, for any pair of different inputs a 1 ,a 2 , the collision probability of their outputs is upper bounded as
The parameter ε appearing in (38) is shown to be confined in the region
and in particular, an ensemble { f X } with ε = 1 is simply called a universal 2 function ensemble. The equality condition of (39) with q = 2 is given in [19, Th. 2] .
Two important examples of universal 2 hash function ensembles are the Toeplitz matrices (see [3] ), and multiplications over a finite field (see [1] , [4] ). A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be universal 2 , which is given by a concatenation (X, I ) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I [18] . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm with complexity O(n log n) (see, e.g., [5] ).
The following proposition holds for any universal 2 function ensemble.
Proposition 10 (Renner [22, Lemma 5.4.3] ): Given any composite c-q sub-state ρ A,E on H A ⊗H E and any normalized state σ E on H E , any universal 2 ensemble of hash functions
More precisely, the inequality
holds.
B. Ensemble of Linear Hash Functions
Tsurumaru and Hayashi [19] focused on linear functions over the finite field F 2 . Now, we treat the case of linear functions over a finite field F q , where q is a power of a prime number p. That is, the following contents are generalization of the arguments given in [19] . Further, the contents with respect to the modified mutual information are not given in [19] even with q = 2. We assume that sets A, B are F n q , F m q respectively with n ≥ m, and f are linear functions over F q . Note that, in this case, there is a kernel C corresponding to a given linear function f , which is a vector space of the dimension n − m or more. Conversely, when given a vector subspace C ⊂ F n q of the dimension n − m or more, we can always construct a linear function
That is, we can always identify a linear hash function f C and a code C.
When C X = Ker f X , the definition of ε-universal 2 function ensemble of (38) takes the form
which is equivalent with
This shows that the ensemble of kernel {C X } contains sufficient information for determining if a function ensemble { f X } is ε-almost universal 2 or not. For a given ensemble of codes {C X }, we define its minimum (respectively, maximum) dimension as t min := min X dim C X (respectively, t max := max X dim C X ). Then, we say that a linear code ensemble {C X } of minimum (or maximum) dimension t is an ε-almost universal 2 code ensemble, if the following condition is satisfied
In particular, if ε = 1, we call {C X } a universal 2 code ensemble.
C. Dual Universality of a Code Ensemble
Based on Tsurumaru and Hayashi [19] , we define several variations of the universality of an ensemble of error-correcting codes and the linear functions as follows. First, we define the dual code ensemble {C X } ⊥ of a given linear code ensemble {C X } as the set of all dual codes of C X . That is, {C X } ⊥ = {C ⊥ X }. We also introduce the notion of dual universality as follows. We say that a code ensemble
if the kernels C X of f X forms an ε-almost dual universal 2 code ensemble with minimum dimension n − m. This condition is equivalent with the condition that the ensemble of the linear spaces spanned by the generating matrix of f X forms an ε-almost universal 2 code ensemble with maximum dimension m. An explicit example of a dual universal 2 function ensemble (with ε = 1) can be given by the modified Toeplitz matrices mentioned earlier [16] , i.e., a concatenation (X, I ) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I . This example is particularly useful in practice because it is both universal 2 and dual universal 2 , and also because there exists an efficient algorithm with complexity O(n log n).
With these preliminaries, we can present the following theorem as F q extension of [19, Corollary 2] :
As a special case, we obtain the following.
Corollary 12: Any universal 2 linear function ensemble { f X } over a finite filed F q is q-almost dual universal 2 function ensemble.
D. Permuted Code Ensemble
In order to treat an example of ε-almost universal 2 functions, we consider the case when the distribution is invariant under permutations of the order in F n q = A n . Now, S n denotes the symmetric group of degree n, and σ (i ) = j means that
Then, we introduce the permuted code ensemble {σ (C)} σ ∈S n of a code C. In this ensemble, σ obeys the uniform distribution on S n .
For an element x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n q , we can define the empirical distribution p x on F q as p x (a) := #{i |x i = a}/n. So, we denote the set of the empirical distribu-
Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 13: The permuted code ensemble {σ (C)} σ ∈S n of a code C is ε(C)-almost universal 2 .
Proof: For any non-zero element x ∈ F n q , we fix an empirical distribution p := p x . Then, x belongs to σ (C) with the probability #{x∈C| p x = p} #{x∈F n q | p x = p} . That is, the probability that x belongs to σ (C) is less than ε(C)|C| q n . Lemma 14: For any t ≤ n, there exists a t-dimensional code C ∈ F n q such that
and thus
Hence,
Therefore, there exists a code C satisfying the desired condition (46) .
E. δ-Biased Ensemble
Next, according to Dodis and Smith [12] , we introduce a δ-biased ensemble of random variables W X on a vector space over a general finite field F q , where q is the power of the prime p. First, we fix a non-degenerate bilinear form ( , )
holds for any x = 0 ∈ F n q , where ω p := e 2π i p . We denote the random variable subject to the uniform distribution on a code C ∈ F n q , by W C . Then,
Using the above relation, as is suggested in [12, Case 2], we obtain the following lemma.
In the following, we treat the case of A = F n q . Given a composite state ρ A,E on H A ⊗ H E and a distribution P W on A, we define another composite state ρ A,E * P W :=
Then, using this concept, Fehr and Schaffner [13] obtain the following proposition as a quantum extension of Lemma 4 of Dodis and Smith [12] . 
More precisely,
Remark 2: Dodis and Smith [12] defined the concept of "δ-biased" only in the case with q = 2. Fehr and Schaffner [13] extended this lemma to the quantum setting in the case with q = 2 by using Fourier analysis. Since the Fourier analysis is essential for their proof, by defining the concept of "δ-biased" in the case with a general prime power q by (50), we can naturally extend their proof [13] to the general case. The proof of Proposition 16 with a general prime power q in the commutative case is given in [71] . Lemma 17 was essentially shown in [13, Corollary 6.2] . in terms of "δ-biased" when q = 2. However, "δ-biased" is a concept not for families of hash functions, but for families of random variables. Our interest is what hash function can guarantee the security of the final keys. Hence, it is better to give the evaluation as a generalization of the leftover hashing lemma for linear universal 2 hash functions based on ε-almost dual universality 2 . Then, the paper [19] gave the following lemma for q = 2. For readers' convenience, we give a proof for a general prime power q.
Proposition 16 yields the following lemma.
In other words, an ε-almost dual universal 2 function fam- (54) and (55). Proof: Due to Lemma 15 and (52), we obtain
Thus, (56) implies
Therefore,
which implies (54) . Similarly, Lemma 15, (53) , and (57) imply that
IV. SECURITY BOUNDS WITH RÉNYI ENTROPY OF ORDER 2
Next, we consider the quantum case for the security bound based on the Rényi entropy of order 2. Renner 
Further, the inequalities used in proof of Renner [22, Corollary 5.6.1] imply that
Applying the same discussion to the von Neumann entropy, we can evaluate the average of the modified mutual information criterion by using
Further, when a composite c-q sub-state
whereM
we have
Taking the logarithm, we obtain
Substituting
Since the function x → log(1 + x) is concave, we obtain
which implies (58) . The inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x yields (59). Fannes inequality guarantees that
Therefore, (64) and (63) imply that
Therefore, taking the expectation of X, we obtain (60), which implies (61) . In this proof, the condition ρ E ≤ ρ E is crucial because Inequality (62) cannot be shown without this condition. Now, we evaluate the security by combining Proposition 10 and Lemmas 18 and 19. For this purpose, we introduce the quantities
whereM := max{M, d E } and
Note that
has additional constraints for ρ A,E . Then, we obtain the following lemma under the universal 2 condition.
Lemma 20: Given a normalized state σ E on H E and c-q sub-states ρ A,E , any universal 2 ensemble of hash functions
When ρ A,E is a normalized c-q state, it satisfies 
Then, Renner [22, Corollary 5.6.1] obtained another upper bound:
where
That is, he proposed to evaluate d,min (M, 1|ρ A,E ) instead of d,2 (M, 1|ρ A,E ). However, the bound d,2 (M, 1|ρ A,E ) gives a strictly better bound in the following sense.
When there is no side information, i.e., the state is given as a distribution P A on A, the previous paper [17] showed that −1 n log d,min (e n R , 1|P n A ) < −1 n log d,2 (e n R , 1|P n A ).
Further, when the side information is classical, i.e., the state is given as a joint distribution P A,E on the joint system, the paper [71] showed that
That is, in these cases, d,2 (e n R , 1|ρ ⊗n A,E ) gives a strictly better exponential decreasing rate. Hence, we focus on the bounds based on Rényi entropy of order 2 rather than those based on min entropy.
Since the function x → η(x, y) is concave, combing Inequality (35) , we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 21: Any universal 2 ensemble of hash functions f X from A to {1, . . . , M} and any normalized c-q state ρ A,
Since the function x → √ x is concave, combing Inequality (33) , we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 22: Any universal 2 ensemble of hash functions f X from A to {1, . . . , M} and any normalized c-q state ρ A, 
When ρ A,E is a normalized c-q state, we have
can be evaluated by bounding the quantities d,2 (M, ε|ρ A,E ) and I,2 (M, ε|ρ A,E ). In the next section, we derive upper bounds of these quantities.
V. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NO ERROR: SINGLE-SHOT CASE
In this section, in order to evaluate the security of secret key generation with no error in the single-shot case, we evaluate the upper bounds d,2 (M, ε|ρ A,E ), and I,2 (M, ε|ρ A,E ).
A. L 1 Distinguishability Criterion
In order to describe our upper bound of d,2 (M, ε|ρ A,E ), we introduce two notations. We denote the number of eigenvalues by v(σ E ), and define the real number λ(σ E ) := log a 1 − log a 0 by using the maximum eigenvalue a 1 and the minimum eigenvalue a 0 of σ E . Then, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 24: Given any c-q sub-state ρ A,E on H A ⊗ H E and any normalized state σ E on H E , we have
for s ∈ (0, 1]. Further, when ρ A,E is normalized,
A,E /Tr ρ 1+s A,E ). Indeed, the number v(σ E ) increase at most polynomially when σ E is i.i.d. However, otherwise, it does not generally behaves polynomially with respect to the system size when the system size increases. On the other hand, the number λ(σ E ) is decided only by the ratio between the maximum and the minimum eigenvalues. In many cases, we can expect that the number λ(σ E ) behaves linearly with respect to the system size when the system size increases.
Proof of Theorem 24: When ρ A,E = Pρ A,E P with a projection P, Schwartz inequality implies that ρ A,
Further, using (7), we have
where (a) follows the commutativity between σ E and Pσ
Substituting (82) and (83) into RHS of (81), we obtain
where (a) follows from (12) . Hence, we obtain (77). Next, we show (78) . For this purpose, we choose a positive integer l. For the given λ = λ(σ E ), we define σ E by the following procedure. First, we diagonalize σ E as σ E = y s y |u y u y |. We choose a 0 to be the minimum s y , and define s y := a 0 e λ when s y = a 0 . We define s y := a 0 e λi when log s y ∈ (log a 0 + λ l (i − 1), log a 0 + λ l i ] for i = 1, . . . , l. Then, we define σ E := y s y |u y u y |. Note that the index i corresponds to the interval (log a 0 + λ l (i − 1), log a 0 + λ l i ] although the index y does to the eigenvector. Hence,
Substituting λ into l, we obtain (78) . Applying Lemma 7, we obtain (79) from (77) with
. Similarly, (77) yields (80). Therefore, we obtain Theorem 24. Remark 3: In our proof of the above theorems, the state ρ A,E is chosen by the information-spectrum-smoothing of the pinched state E σ E (ρ A,E ). Since the choice in [27] is also characterized by the the information-spectrum-smoothing of the pinched state, our choice is the same as the choice in [27] .
B. Modified Mutual Information
The bound I,2 (M, ε|ρ A,E ) can be evaluated by using the conditional Rényi entropy H 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E σ E ) as follows.
Theorem 25: 
We
Hence, we can apply Lemmas 19 and 23.
Further, since P is commutative with I A ⊗ρ E , similar to (82) and (83), we obtain
Substituting (89) and (90) to (86), we obtain (84). Then, (85) follows from (12) . Therefore, we obtain Theorem 25.
VI. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NO ERROR: ASYMPTOTIC CASE
A. Approximate Smoothing of Rényi Entropy of Order 2
Next, we consider the quantum case when our state is given by the n-fold independent and identical state ρ A,E , i.e., ρ ⊗n A,E . In this case, we focus on the optimal generation rate
Due to Theorem 24, when the generation rate R = lim n→∞ log M n n is smaller than H (A|E), there exists a sequence of functions f n : A → {1, . . . , e n R } such that
where v n is the number of eigenvalues of (Tr A ρ 1+s A,E ) ⊗n , which is a polynomial increasing for n. Since lim s→0 H G 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E ) = H (A|E|ρ A,E ), there exists a number s ∈ (0, 1] such that s 2 H G 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E ) − s R 2 > 0. Thus, the right hand side of (91) goes to zero exponentially. Conversely, due to (13) , any sequence of functions f n : A n → {1, . . . , e n R } satisfies that
That is, when R > H (A|E|ρ A,E ),
does not go to zero. Due to (33) , d 1 ( f n (A)|E|ρ ⊗n A,E ) does not go to zero. Hence, we can recover the result by [45] as
In order to treat the speed of this convergence, we focus on the exponentially decreasing rate (exponent) of d 1 ( f n (A)|E|ρ ⊗n A,E ) for a given R. As another criterion, we also focus on a variant I ( f n (A n )|E n |ρ ⊗n
For this purpose, we evaluate the exponential deceasing rates of upper bounds. For a given polynomial P(n), Theorems 24 and 25 yield that 
When the side information is classical, i.e., the state is given as a joint distribution P A,E on the joint system, the equation
is shown by the combination of [71] and the forthcoming paper [53] . 2 Hence, our evaluation (95) is not tight in general. However, Equality in (95) holds in a special case given in Subsection VIII-B as Lemma 36. Since the example given in Subsection VIII-B is very natural in the quantum case, our evaluation is useful in the quantum setting.
Applying Lemma 20, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 26: When a function ensemble f X n from A n to {1, . . . , e n R } is universal 2 
(99) Similarly, using Lemma 23, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 27: When an ensemble of linear functions f X n from A n to {1, . . . , e n R } is P(n)-almost dual universal 2 , we have
In particular, when the code C n satisfies condition (46), we have
B. Comparison for Exponents
Now, we compare exponents given in Theorem 26 with exponents derived by Corollaries 21 and 22. When a function ensemble f X n from A n to {1, . . . , e n R } is universal 2 , Corollary 22 yields the inequality
Similarly, Corollary 21 yields the inequality
under the same condition for a function ensemble f X n . In order to compare (104) and (105) with (98) and (99), respectively, we prepare the following lemma for two exponents e H, q(ρA,E |R) and e G, q(ρA,E |R).
Lemma 28: We obtain 1 2 e H, q(ρA,E |R) ≤ e G, q(ρA,E |R).
Further, when the relations
hold, we obtain a stronger inequality e H, q(ρA,E |R) ≤ e G, q(ρA,E |R).
(109) Hence, we can conclude that (98) is better than (104). Similarly, under the condition in Lemma 28, (105) is better than (99). However, the relation between (105) and (99) is not clear in general, now. The condition (107) seems too restrictive. Since a typical example given in Section VIII satisfies the condition, Lemma 28 is often useful.
Therefore, when the number n is sufficiently large, Inequalities (79) and (80) are better evaluations for the average E X n d 1 ( f X n (A n )|E n |ρ ⊗n A,E ) of the L 1 distinguishability criterions than Corollary 22. In this case, if (109) holds, Corollary 21 gives a better evaluation for the average of the modified mutual information criterion E X n I ( f X n (A n )|E n |ρ ⊗n A,E ) than Inequality (85).
Proof of Lemma 28: Lemma 7 yields that
where Inequality (110) follows from the non-negativity of the RHS of (110) and the inequality 1 2−s ≤ 1. Next, we show (109). Assume that the relations (108) and (107) 
Since d ds R(s) = 2−s 2 μ (s) ≤ 0, the maximum max s 
Now, we choose t by t 2−2t = s 2−s . Then, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/2 and t ≤ s when 0 ≤ s ≤ 2/3. Hence,
Since the relation (107) holds, max 0≤t ≤1/2
Finally, we consider our bounds when the state ρ (n)
A,E is given as a non-i.i.d. state on the system (H A ⊗ H E ) ⊗n . In this case, the speeds of increase of v and v s are not polynomial with respect to the size n of the system, in general. Hence, when n is sufficiently large, the factor v and v s are not negligible. However, when the minimum eigenvalue of ρ (n)
A,E is greater than c n with a constant c > 0, the minimum eigenvalue of Tr A (ρ (n)
A,E ) 1+s /Tr (ρ (n) A,E ) 1+s is greater than c (1+s)n . Hence, λ s increases linearly with respect to n. Thus, when the key generation rate is R, the upper bound (80) for the L 1 distinguishability criterion has the factor of the 
VII. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH ERROR CORRECTION
A. Protocol
Next, we apply the above discussions to secret key generation with public communication. Alice is assumed to have an initial random variable a ∈ A, which is generated with the probability p a , and Bob and Eve are assumed to have their initial quantum states ρ B|a and ρ E|a on their quantum systems H B and H E , respectively. The task for Alice and Bob is to share a common random variable almost independent of Eve's quantum state by using a public communication. The quality is evaluated by three quantities: the size of the final common random variable, the probability of the disagreement of their final variables (error probability), and the information leaked to Eve, which can be quantified by the L 1 distinguishability criterion or the modified mutual information criterion between Alice's final variables and Eve's state.
In order to construct a protocol for this task, we assume that the set A is a vector space on a finite field F q . Indeed, even if the cardinality |A| is not a prime power, it becomes a prime power by adding elements with zero probability. Hence, we can assume that the cardinality |A| is a prime power q without loss of generality. Then, the secret key agreement can be realized by the following two steps: The first is the error correction, and the second is the privacy amplification. In the error correction, Alice and Bob prepare a linear subspace C 1 ⊂ A and the representatives a(x) of all cosets x ∈ A/C 1 .
Alice sends the coset information [ A] ∈ A/C 1 to Bob in stead of her random variable A ∈ A, and Bob obtain his estimatê A of A ∈ A from his quantum state on H B and [ A] ∈ A/C 1 . Alice obtains her random variable A 1 := A − a([ A]) ∈ C 1 , and Bob obtains his random variableÂ 1 :=Â − a([B]) ∈ C 1 .
In the privacy amplification, Alice and Bob prepare a common hash function f on C 1 . Then, applying the hash function f to the their variables A 1 andÂ 1 , they obtain their final random variables f (A 1 ) and f (Â 1 ).
Indeed, the above protocol depends on the choice of estimator that gives the estimateÂ from [ A] ∈ A/C 1 and his random variable B ∈ B (or his quantum state on H B ). In the remaining part of this section, we give the protocols and discuss their performances.
B. Error Probability
In the following, we give the concrete form of the estimator and evaluate the error probability when Bob's information is quantum. We should remark that this situation is different from the classical-quantum channel coding [76] , [77] . In the latter setting, a classical-quantum channel is given, and we choose what elements in the input alphabet are transmitted. However, in our setting, Alice's random variable are priorly given, and we choose a partial information of Alice's random variable in order that Bob estimates Alice's random variable.
In this case, we construct an estimator forÂ in the following way. For a given code C 1 ⊂ A and a normalized c-q state ρ A,B = a P A (a)|a a| ⊗ ρ B|a , our decoder is given as follows: First, we define the projection:
where t is the dimension of C 
Then, Bob chooses the outcome a as the estimateÂ. Next, to give an exponential decreasing rates of the error probability, we evaluate the error probability in the single-shot case by using the conditional Rényi entropy 
C. Leaked Information With Fixed Error Correction
As is mentioned in the previous sections, we have two criteria for the quality of secret random variables. Given a code C 1 ⊂ A and a hash function f , the first criterion is d 1 ( f (A 1 
)|[ A], E|ρ A,E ), and the second criterion is I ( f (A 1 )|[ A], E|ρ A,E ). Note that the random variable A can be written by the pair of A 1 and [ A] given in Subsection VII-A.
To give exponential decreasing rates of these security criteria in the i.i.d. case, we evaluate these security criteria in the single-shot case by using the conditional Rényi entropy 
hold for s ∈ (0, 1] , where v is the number of eigenvalues of Tr A ρ 1+s A,E , v is the number of eigenvalues of ρ E , L is the amount of sacrifice information |C 1 |/M, and M := max{M, d E }.
Proof: The relation (79) in Theorem 24 and the relation (21) guarantee that
for s ∈ (0, 1], which implies (114 
where v is the number of eigenvalues of Tr A ρ 1+s A,E , v is the number of eigenvalues of ρ E , L is the amount of sacrifice information |C 1 |/M, and M := max{M, d E }.
Remark 4: Similar to (114) and (116), using (80), we can show formulas with the logarithmic ratio λ between the maximum and minimum eigenvalues of Tr A ρ 1+s
A,E .
D. Leaked Information With Randomized Error Correction Code
Next, we evaluate leaked information when the error correcting code C 1 is chosen from an ε 1 -almost universal 2 code ensemble. In this case, using the conditional Rényi entropy H 1+s (A|E|ρ A,E ) with s ∈ (0, 1], we can improve the evaluation for the average of the modified mutual information criterion. The evaluation also improves the exponential decreasing rate in the i.i.d. case.
Theorem 31: We choose the code C 1 from an ε 1 -almost universal 2 code ensemble {C X } with the dimension t. Assume that { f Y } is an ε 2 -almost dual universal 2 ensemble of hash functions from A/C X to {1, . . . , M}, the random variables X and Y are independent of each other, and ε 2 ≥ 2.
ensemble of hash functions from A/C X to {1, . . . , M},
(119) Proof: We choose a sub cq-state ρ A,E = a |a a|⊗ρ E|a such that ρ E ≤ ρ E and ρ A ≤ ρ A . Due to (55) , we obtain
Since the matrix ρ A,E satisfies
where the first inequality follows from ε 2 ≥ 1. Hence, we obtain
Applying Jensen's inequality to x → log x, we obtain
Using (16) in Lemma 6, (64) , and (14), we obtain
Combining (120) and (121), we obtain
Applying the same discussion as the proof of Theorem 25, we obtain
Similarly, we can show (119).
E. Asymptotic Analysis
Next, we consider the case when the c-q state is given as the n-fold independent and identical extension ρ ⊗n A,B,E of a c-q normalized state ρ A,B,E , where A is F q . Now, we fix codes C 1,n in F n q with the dimension n R 1 log q . Then, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 32: When { f X } is a universal 2 ensemble of hash Next, we consider the case when the error correcting code is chosen randomly. In this case, the exponential decreasing rate for I ( f X (A 1,n 
A,E ) can be improved as follows. Theorem 34: For independent random variables X, Y, we assume that the code ensemble {C X } with the dimension n R 1 log q is universal 2 
, the relations (124), (115), and
which yields (127). Due to (113), the error probability can be bounded as E X n P e [ρ ⊗n A,B , C X n ] ≤ P(n)e n(s(R 1 −log q)+s H 1−s ( A|B|ρ A,B ) ) for s ∈ [0, 1], which implies (126). Similarly, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 35: For an arbitrary polynomial P(n) and the independent random variables X, Y, we assume that the code ensemble {C X } with the dimension n R 1 log q is universal 2 and { f Y } is a P(n)-almost dual universal 2 ensemble of hash func-
, the relations (124), (115), (126), and (127) hold. For a comparison between two exponents e G, q(ρA,E |R) and e G, q(ρA,E |R), see Lemma 28.
VIII. APPLICATION TO GENERALIZED PAULI CHANNEL
A. General Case
In order to apply the above results to quantum key distribution, we treat the quantum state generated by transmission by a generalized Pauli channel in the p-dimensional system H. First, we define the discrete Weyl-Heisenberg representation W for F 2 p :
where ω is the root of the unity with the order p. Using this representation and a probability distribution P X Z on F 2 p , we can define the generalized Pauli channel:
In the following, we assume that the eavesdropper can access all of the environment of the channel E P . When the state | j is input to the channel E P , the environment system is spanned by the basis {|x, z E }. Then, the state ρ E| j of the environment (Eve's state) and Bob's state ρ B| j are given as
holds. Hence,
Then, we obtain the following state after the quantum state transmission via the generalized Pauli channel.
In this setting, the joint state ρ A,B is classical, we can apply the classical theory for error probability. Since
. Now, we choose the rate R 1 of size of code C 1 . When {C X n } is the P(n)-almost universal 2 code ensemble in F n q with the dimension n R 1 log p , due to [71, eq. (243)], the decoding error probability can be bounded as
That is,
Next, we treat the leaked information. In the following discussion, we fix codes C 1,n in F n p . Since ρ A,E = a 1 q |a a|⊗ ρ E|a , we have
That is, we have
Now, we consider the case with randomized error correction. Given a sequence of fixed codes C 1,n , we focus on a sequence of ensembles of hash functions of F n p /C 1,n with the rate R 2 of sacrifice information (i.e., with the sacrifice bit length L = n R 2 ).
In this case, the numbers of eigenvalues of ρ ⊗n E and Tr A (ρ ⊗n A,E ) 1+s are less than (n + 1) ( p 2 −1) . Thus, when the code ensemble {C X } with the dimension n R 1 log q is universal 2 and { f Y } is an ε-almost dual universal 2 ensemble of hash
, (116), (117), and (118) yield that
In particular, when { f Y } is a universal 2 ensemble of hash functions, due to (114), (115), and (119), the real number ε can be replaced by 1 in the above inequalities.
Here, we need a remark for (133). The second input of the function η in (133) is n log p not 2n log p. In this case, the state ρ A is the uniform distribution, we can use (34) instead of (35) . Hence, we can replace 2n log p by n log p.
The exponents e G, q(ρA,E | log p − R 2 ) and e H, q(ρA,E | log p − R 2 ) are calculated as
where s 2−s = t 2 . In fact, our bound in (137) is the same as the bound obtained by the recent paper [19, eq. (60) ] via the phase error correction approach. This fact seems the goodness of our bound and our approach.
Since s 1+s ≤ 2s 2+s for s ∈ [0, 1], Lemma 5 guarantees that H 1− 2s 2+s (X|Z |P X,Z ) ≥ H 1− s 1+s (X|Z |P X,Z ), which implies e H, q(ρA,E | log p− R 2 ) ≤ e G, q(ρA,E | log p− R 2 ). That is, (133) gives a better exponent than (134). Since the relation (107) holds due to (131), this case can be regard as a special case of Lemma 28. Thus, we obtain
However, there still exists a possibility that the evaluation (134) gives a better evaluation than (133) in the finite length setting.
B. Independent Case
Next, we consider the case when the two random variables X and Z are independent, Eve's state ρ E| j has the 
(X|P X )) Thick line: − 1 n log min 0≤s≤1 (RHS of (140)), Normal line: − 1 n log min 0≤s≤1 (RHS of (141)) with n = 10, 000, p = 2, P X (0) = 0.9, P X (1) = 0.1.
following form:
In this case, the system spanned by {|z Z } has no correlation with j , and only the system spanned by {|x X } has correlation with j . So, we can replace ρ E| j by the following way:
In this case, the numbers of eigenvalues of ρ E and Tr A ρ 1+s
A,E are less than p. Hence, the numbers of eigenvalues of ρ ⊗n E and Tr A (ρ ⊗n A,E ) 1+s are less than (n +1) ( p−1) . When we choose ε = 1 for simplicity, the inequalities (132), (133), and (134) can be simplified to
, n(log p)),
Hence, we obtain
Here, we compare the evaluations (140) and (141). As is explained in the previous subsection, the exponent of (140) is better than (141). This relation can be numerically checked in Fig. 1 with the parameters p = 2, P X (0) = 0.9, P X (1) = 0.1, and R ∈ (0.53, 0.58). However, in the case of a finite n, − 1 n log min 0≤s≤1 (RHS of (140)) is not necessarily larger than − 1 n log min 0≤s≤1 (RHS of (141) ). The relation between these two quantities is also numerically demonstrated in Fig. 1 with the same parameters when n = 10, 000. This numerical result suggests that the exponents can not necessarily decide the order of advantages with the finite size n when n is not sufficiently large.
Next, we consider the case when there is no error in Z basis. In this case, it is sufficient to apply only privacy amplification. Hence, we evaluate the upper bounds d,2 (e n R , ε 1 |ρ ⊗n A,E ) as follows.
Lemma 36: When p = 2 and ρ A,E = x∈F 2 1 2 |x x| ⊗ |x :
Lemma 36 is proven in Appendix E.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have derived upper bounds for the leaked information in the modified mutual information criterion and the L 1 distinguishability criterion in the quantum case when we apply a family of universal 2 hash functions or a family of ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions for privacy amplification (Theorems 24 and 25 in Section V). Then, we have derived lower bounds on their exponential decreasing rates in the i.i.d. setting. (Theorems 26 and 27 in Section VI). The obtained bound for the L 1 distinguishability criterion has been shown to be tight in the qubit case when the state is generated by transmission via Pauli channel (Appendix E). The obtained exponents are summarized in Table II . We have also applied our result to the case when we need error correction. In this case, we apply the privacy amplification after error correction as given in Subsection VII-A. Then, we have derived upper bounds for the information leaked with respect to the final keys in the respective criteria as well as upper bounds for the probability for disagreement in the final keys (Theorems 29, 30, and 31 in Section VII). Applying them to the i.i.d. setting, we have derived lower bounds on their exponential decreasing rates. (Theorems 32, 33, 34, and 35 in Section VII).
Since a family of ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions is a larger family of linear universal 2 hash functions, the obtained result suggests a possibility of the existence of an effective privacy amplification protocol with a smaller calculation time than known privacy amplification protocols. In fact, as shown in the recent paper [46] , there exists an example of ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions with a smaller calculation amount and smaller number of random variables than the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix. In the ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions, when we use the non-uniform random seeds, the parameter ε increases dependently of the minimum entropy of the random seeds [46] . Even if the parameter ε increases, unless the parameter ε does exponentially, we have the same exponential evaluation. On the other hand, as shown in [19] , ε-almost universal 2 hash functions are not secure in general when ε is greater than 2. This fact shows the advantage of ε-almost dual universality 2 over ε-almost universality 2 . Hence, it is expected that the obtained evaluation for ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions has a future application from an applied viewpoint.
In fact, our bounds have polynomial factors due to the noncommutativity. When the order of these polynomial factors are large and the number n is not sufficiently large, the bounds do not work well. Fortunately, as is discussed in Subsection VI, some of them have the order n 3/2 at most. We can expect that these types of bounds work well even when the number n is not sufficiently large. These types of bounds and these discussions have been extended to the case when error correction is needed. Further, as is discussed in Subsubsection VI-C, we can expect that some of obtained bounds work well even in the non-i.i.d. case.
In Section VIII, we have applied our result to the case when Eve obtains the all information leaked to the environment via Pauli channel. In this case, our bounds can be described by using the joint classical distribution with respect to the bit error and the phase error. We have numerically compared the obtained lower bounds on the exponential decreasing rates for leaked information.
Due to Pinsker inequality and Inequality (35) , the exponential convergence of one criterion yields the exponential convergence of the other criterion. However, we have shown that better exponential decreasing rates can be obtained by separate derivations. Our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 yields the lower bound e G, q( P A,E |R) of the exponent of the L 1 distinguishability criterion, which yields the lower bound e G, q( P A,E |R) of the exponent of the modified mutual information criterion by using Pinsker inequality. Similarly, our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 yields the lower bound e H, q( P A,E |R) of the exponent of the modified mutual information criterion, which yields the lower bound e H, q ( P A,E |R) 2 of the exponent of the L 1 distinguishability criterion by Inequality (33) . Since e G, q( P A,E |R) ≥ e H, q ( P A,E |R) 2
, we can conclude that the evaluation of the L 1 distinguishability criterion becomes worse if it goes through another criterion. However, since we have not derived the definitive relation between e H, q( P A,E |R) and e G, q( P A,E |R), we cannot say the same thing for the modified mutual information criterion. The relation is also a future problem.
APPENDIX A MODIFIED MUTUAL INFORMATION CRITERION
It is natural to adopt a quantity expressing the difference between the true state and the ideal state ρ mix,A ⊗ ρ E as a security criterion.However, there are several quantities expressing the difference between two states. Both d 1 (A|E|ρ) and I (A|E|ρ) are characterized in this way. Here, we show that the modified mutual criterion I (A|E|ρ) can be derived in a natural way.
It is natural assume the following condition for the security criterion C(A; E|ρ) as well as the unitary invariance on H E and the permutation invariance on H A . C1 Chain rule C(A, B|E|ρ) = C(B|E|ρ) + C(A|B, E|ρ). C2 Linearity When two states ρ 1 and ρ 2 are distinghuish-
Unfortunately, the L 1 distinguishability does not satisfies C1 Chain rule. However, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 37: The modified mutual information criterion I (A|E|ρ) = log d A − H (A|E|ρ) satisfies all of these conditions.
Further, we have the following theorem. Theorem 38: When C(A|E|ρ) satisfies all of the above properties and ρ is written as a,e P A,E (a, e)|a, e a, e|,
That is, in the classical case, the security criterion is written by using the conditional entropy. In the quantum case, the above theorem cannot determine uniquely the security criterion. Since the most natural quantum extension of the conditional entropy is the quantum conditional entropy H (A|E|ρ). Hence, it is natural to adopt the modified mutual information criterion I (A|E|ρ) as a security criterion. In particular, if one emphasizes C1 Chain rule rather than the universal composability, it is better employ the modified mutual information criterion I (A|E|ρ).
Proof of Lemma 37: We can trivially check the conditions C4 Ideal case and C5 Normalization. We show other conditions. C1 Chain rule can be shown as follows.
When two states ρ 1 and ρ 2 are distinghuishable on H E ,
which implies C2 Linearity. (150) Further, we see that the quantityH (A|E| a P A|E (a|e)|a, e a, e|) satisfies Khinchin's axioms [73] for entropy due to the remaining conditions. Hence, we find thatH (A|E| a P A|E (a|e)|a, e a, e|) = H (P A|E=e ). Thus, H (A|E|ρ) is equal to the conditional entropy H (A|E|ρ). Hence, C(A|E|ρ) = I (A|E|ρ).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 3
First, we focus on the spectral decomposition of σ : σ = i s i E i . Since x → x 1+s 2 is operator concave,
When v is the number of eigenvectors of σ Inequality (7) implies
Since E i and E i are orthogonal to each other for i = i ,
Combining (144), (145), and (146), we obtain
Thus, (4) implies
That is, ψ(s|ρ σ ) ≤ log v + ψ(s|ρ σ ). When we denote the number of eigenvalues of σ ⊗n by v n , we have
Dividing (148) by n and taking the limit n → ∞, we obtain (5) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The convexity of ψ(s|ρ σ ) is shown in [14, Exercise 2.24] . Using this fact, we obtain the desired argument with respect to ψ(s|ρ σ ). The convexity of ψ(s|ρ σ ) can be shown by (149) and (150). Now, we consider two kinds of inner products between two matrices X and Y : In particular, when ρ and σ are not completely mixed, the above inequalities are strict. Hence, the functions s → ψ(s|ρ σ ), ψ (s|ρ σ ) are strictly convex.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Assume that s ∈ (0, ∞). For two non-negative matrices X and Y , the reverse operator Hölder inequality
holds. Substituting a P A (a) 1+s ρ 1+s
E|a and σ −s E to X and Y , we obtain
Since the equality holds when
which implies (18) . When s ∈ (−1, 0), applying the operator Hölder inequality Tr XY ≤ (Tr X 1/(1+s) ) 1+s (Tr Y −1/s ) −s instead of the reverse operator Hölder inequality, we obtain
The equality can be shown in the same way.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 36
A. Outline of the Proof
it is enough to show the opposite inequality. For this purpose, we will show the following lemma. Lemma 39: When we choose an n(1 − R) -dimensional subspace C Z ⊂ F n 2 with equal probability, we obtain
Here, we prove Lemma 36 by using Lemma 39. When we choose an n(1 − R log 2 ) -dimensional subspace C Z ⊂ F n 2 with equal probability, since the hash function X → [X] C Z satisfies the universal 2 condition, we obtain
which implies that
Since Inequality (142) is the opposite inequality, we obtain (143).
In the following, we prepare two lemmas for the proof of Lemma 39. Given a code C ⊂ F n p , we can define its 
holds. In order to describe the maximum likelihood estimator of the code C ⊥ under the distribution P X , we define
. Then, the decoding error probability is given as
Lemma 40: The relation
holds for a ∈ F n 2 . The proof of Lemma 40 is given in Appendix E-B. Now, we consider the binary case, i.e., the case of F n 2 . We choose an m-dimensional subspace C X ⊂ F n 2 with equal probability. That is, there are G(m) :
Hence, we chose each of them with the probability 1/G(m).
Lemma 41: When we choose an n R -dimensional subspace C X ⊂ F n 2 with equal probability,
The proof of Lemma 41 is given in Appendix E-C.
Proof of Lemma 39:
We apply Lemma 41 to the case C X = C ⊥ Z . Then, the exponential decreasing rates of the upper and lower bounds given in Lemma 40 are max 0≤s≤1/2
, which implies (152).
B. Proof of Lemma 40
In this proof, we abbreviate
Since
Next, we prove the inequality (157). For this purpose, we define the fidelity as
The fidelity satisfies that
and is characterized as
Since 
Then, we have the relation
where {|x 1 R } is a CONS on another system. Thus,
Using the relation
which implies (156).
C. Proof of Lemma 41
In this proof, we abbreviate [x] C X by [x] . It was shown in [19, Th. 7 
We can show the following lemma. Lemma 42:
(165) Lemma 42 is shown in Appendix IX-E.
Hence, it is enough to show that
Now, we denote the set of empirical distributions on F 2 with n trials by T n . The cardinality |T n | is n + 1 [34] . When T n (Q) represents the set of n-trial data whose empirical distribution is Q, the cardinality of T n (Q) can be evaluated as [34] :
where x is the minimum integer m satisfying m ≥ x, and x is the maximum m satisfying m ≤ x. Since any element a ∈ T n (Q) satisfies
we obtain an important formula 1 n + 1 e −n D(Q P X ) ≤ P n X (T n (Q)) ≤ e −n D(Q P X ) . (170)
Now, we prepare the following lemma in the finite-length case.
Lemma 43: Assume that we choose an m-dimensional subspace C X ⊂ F n 2 with equal probability. When Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ T n satisfies that H (Q 1 ) ≤ 2 n−m and D(
(173) The proof of Lemma 43 is given in Appendix E-D.
Since (172) shows (167), we will show (166) by using (171).
Choosing
where inf Q 1 ,Q 2 in the left hand side is the infimum with respect to Q 1 , Q 2 under the condition that log 2
Since the minimum min Q 1 :
It is known that this quantity is the optimal error exponent with the source coding with the compression rate log 2(1− R), which is equal to max 0≤s≤1/2 s H 1−s ( P X )−s log 2(1−R) 1−s . Hence, combining (171), (171), (176), and the above mentioned fact, we obtain (158).
Proof of (174):
Thus,
which implies (174).
D. Proof of Lemma 43
In this proof, we abbreviate [x] C X by [x]. In Lemma 43, we choose an m-dimensional subspace C X ⊂ F n 2 with equal probability. That is, there are G(m) := m−1 i=0
2 n −2 i 2 m −2 i distinct m-dimensional subspace in F n 2 . Hence, we chose each of them with the probability 1/G(m). Now, we show (172). Since x → √ x is concave for s ∈ [0, 1], we have
Since the quantity [x 2 ]∈F n 2 /C X P n X ([x 2 ]) − P n X (x([x 2 ])) is the average error probability when we apply maximum likelihood decoder, it can be evaluated as with s ∈ [0, 1 2 ]. Combining (177) and (178), we obtain (172). Next, we proceed to the proof of (171). For distinct elements y 1 , . . . , y l , y l+1 , . . . , y l+k ∈ F n 2 , we define the number M(y 1 , . . . , y l |y l+1 , . . . , y l+k ) as the number of cases that one of y 1 , . . . , y l belongs to C X and one of y l+1 , . . . , y l+k belongs to C X . In particular, M(y 1 , . . . , y l |∅) denotes the number of cases that one of y 1 , . . . , y l belongs to C X . Then, we prepare the following lemma. (180) The proof of Lemma 44 is given in the end of this subsection. Now, using Lemma 44, we show (171). We define a([x 2 ]) to be 1 if [x 2 ] ∩ T n (Q 1 ) = ∅, and to be 0 otherwise. We also define N([x 2 ]) the number of elements of [x 2 ]∩T n (Q 2 ). Then, for any code C and any [x 2 ] ∈ F n 2 /C, P n X (x([x 2 ]))(P n X ([x 2 ]) − P n X (x([x 2 ]))) ≥ a([x 2 ])e − n 2 (D(Q 1 P X )+H (Q 1 )) · e − n 2 (D(Q 2 P X )+H (Q 2 )) N([x 2 ]) = a([x 2 ])e − n 2 (D(Q 1 P X )+H (Q 1 )) · e − n 2 (D(Q 2 P X )+H (Q 2 )) N([x 2 ])N([x 2 ]) − 1 2 . (181)
Next, for x ∈ F n 2 , we define b(C, x) to be 1 if (x + C) ∩ T n (Q 1 ) = ∅, and to be 0 otherwise. We also define the number N(C, x) as the number of elements of (x +C)∩T n (Q 2 ). Hence, · e − n 2 (D(Q 2 P X )+H (Q 2 )) N(C, x) − 1 2 .
b(C X , x)e − n 2 (D(Q 1 P X )+H (Q 1 )) · e − n 2 (D(Q 2 P X )+H (Q 2 )) N(C X , x) − 1 2 ≥ x∈T n (Q 2 ) P X (b(C X , x) = 1)e − n 2 (D(Q 1 P X )+H (Q 1 )) · e − n 2 (D(Q 2 P X )+H (Q 2 )) (E X|b(C X ,x)=1 N(C X , x)) − 1 2 .
Now, we evaluate the values P X (b(C X , x) = 1) and E X|b(C X ,x)=1 N(C X , x).
The condition (x + C X ) ∩ T n (Q 1 ) = ∅ is equivalent with the condition C X ∩ (T n (Q 1 ) − x) = ∅, where (T n (Q 1 ) − x) := ∪ y∈T n (Q 1 ) (y − x). When y 1 , . . . , y l are all non-zero elements of (T n (Q 1 ) − x) for a fixed x, the number of cases that C X ∩ (T n (Q 1 ) − x) = ∅ is M(y 1 , . . . , y l |∅). Lemma 44 guarantees that M(y 1 , . . . , y l |∅) ≥ (|T n (Q 1 )| − 1)( 2 n −2 2 m −2 − |T n (Q 1 )|−2 2 ) m−1 i=2 2 n −2 i 2 m −2 i . Thus, P X (b(C X , x) = 1) ≥ (|T n (Q 1 )| − 1)( 2 n − 2 2 m − 2 − |T n (Q 1 )| − 2 2 ) 2 m (2 m − 2) 2 n (2 n − 2)
= (|T n (Q 1 )| − 1)(1 − (2 m − 2)(|T n (Q 1 )| − 2) 2(2 n − 2) )2 m−n .
The number N(C, x) is the number of elements of C ∩ (T n (Q 2 ) − x). For any non-zero element y ∈ (T n (Q 2 ) − x), M(y 1 , . . . , y l |y ) ≤ l m−1 i=2 2 n −2 i 2 m −2 i . Hence, we have E X|b(C X ,x)=1 N(C X , x) = 1 + y ∈(T n (Q 2 )−x)\{0} P X|b(C X ,x)=1 (y ∈ C X ) = 1 + y ∈(T n (Q 2 )−x)\{0} M(y 1 , . . . , y l |y ) M(y 1 , . . . , y l |∅)
Combining (182), (183), and (184), we obtain
which implies (171). Proof ofLemma 44 We fix the one-dimensional subspace spanned by a non-zero element y 1 ∈ F n 2 . We count the number of m − 1 dimensional subspaces that are orthogonal to y 1 and belong to C X . Hence, M(y 1 |∅) is m−1 i=1 2 n −2 i 2 m −2 i . Next, we consider two elements y 1 and y 2 . We fix the two-dimensional subspace spanned by y 1 and y 2 in F n 2 . We count the number of m − 2 dimensional subspaces that are orthogonal to the two-dimensional subspace and belong to C X . Hence, M(y 1 |y 2 ) is m−1 i=2
2 n −2 i 2 m −2 i . Thus, M(y 1 , y 2 |∅) = M(y 1 |∅) + M(y 2 |∅) − M(y 1 |y 2 )
We consider l + 1 elements y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y l , y l+1 ∈ F n 2 \ {0}. We focus on the two-dimensional subspace C spanned by y l+1 and one of y 1 , . . . , y l . The number of choices of C is at most l. When we fix the subspace C , we consider the number of cases what m −2 dimensional space of the orthogonal space belongs C X . This number of cases is m−1 i=2
2 n −2 i 2 m −2 i . Hence, we obtain (179).
Using (179), we can show (180) with l = 3 as follows.
M(y 1 , y 2 , y 3 |∅) = M(y 1 |∅) + M(y 2 |∅) + M(y 3 |∅) − M(y 1 |y 2 ) − M(y 1 , y 2 |y 3 )
Similarly, using (179), we can show (180) in the general case as follows.
M(y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y l |∅) = M(y 1 |∅) + M(y 2 |∅) + · · · + M(y l |∅) − M(y 1 |y 2 ) − M(y 1 , y 2 |y 3 ) − · · · − M(y 1 , . . . , y l−1 |y l )
E. Proof of Lemma 42
It is enough to show that 
where f (s) := s H 1−s (P X ). Since both quantities are zero when r ≤ H (P X ), it is enough to show (186) with r > H (P X ).
We define the distribution P s (x) := P X (x) 1−s / x P X (x ) 1−s . Since f (s) is strictly convex, f (s) is strictly increasing. Hence, we can define the function s(t) as the inverse function s → f (s). Since d dt
(1 − s(t))t + f (s(t)) = 1 − s(t) − s (t)t + s (t) f (s(t)) = 1 − s(t) > 0 for s(t) ∈ [0, 1), we can define t r as r = (1 − s(t r ))t r + f (s(t r )).
Then, we have s(H (P X )) = 0, t H ( P X ) = H (P X ), and t H ( P s ) = f (s). Hence, when r ∈ [H (P X ), H (P 1 )], we obtain
which is shown below. In the following, we denote the above value by g(r ). Hence, we obtain Since H (Q) = H (P s ), we obtain (192).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is grateful to Dr. Toyohiro Tsurumaru, Dr. Shun Watanabe, Dr. Marco Tomamichel, Dr. William Henry Rosgen, Dr. Li Ke, and Dr. Markus Grassl for a helpful comments. He would like to express his appreciation to the referees of this paper for their helpful comments. He is also grateful to the referee of the first version of [19] for informing the literatures [12] , [13] .
